Posted on September 10, 2013.
“It Takes a Network”: The Rise and Fall of Social Network Analysis in U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine (PDF)
Source: Connections (International Network for Social Network Analysis)
During the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, a group of warrior-thinkers developed a new U.S. Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to fight modern “jihadist” insurgencies. Drawing heavily on social network analysis ideas, COIN principles emphasized population protection and organizational learning and adaptation. As implemented in Iraq by General David Petraeus, the doctrine greatly reduced intercommunal violence although other factors also contributed. But, COIN in Afghanistan under General Stanley McChrystal was unsuccessful in ending the Taliban insurgency. Although the Obama Administration substantially diminished the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency capabilities, social network analytic ideas persist in military policy and practices.
Posted in News, Web/Tech
Posted on August 16, 2013.
Military Justice in cases of U.S. Service members alleged to have caused the death, injury or abuse of non-combatants in Iraq or Afghanistan (PDF)
Source: Defense Legal Policy Board, Subcommittee on Military Justice in Combat Zones
On July 30, 2012, the Secretary of Defense (“SecDef”) established this Subcommittee of the Defense Legal Policy Board and directed it to review and assess the application of military justice in combat zones in cases in which Service members were alleged to have committed offenses against civilians. While this report does not pass judgment on the results of particular cases, this review was prompted by various instances of alleged misconduct by U.S. Service members which caused civilian non-combatant casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. SecDef noted that these situations are rare overall, but are nonetheless “huge flash points” which have the potential to undermine our mission and seriously impact host nation relations if not handled properly. The Subcommittee’s review focused on six specific questions raised by SecDef in his memorandum, a copy of which is provided in Appendix 1 to this report and summarized in Table 1 below.
The Subcommittee’s findings and recommendations are at Section 4.0 of this report. The recommendations are also listed in Appendix III.
Posted in Feature stories, Links of Interest
Posted on August 14, 2013.
From the Defense Legal Policy Board’s report of the Subcommittee on Military Justice in Combat Zones
Military Justice in cases of U.S. Service members alleged to have caused the death, injury or abuse of non-combatants in Iraq or Afghanistan [Final report]
Posted in Links of Interest
Posted on April 25, 2011.
Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis - Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition – Joyprada Swain, Research Associate – March 29, 2011
"The critical role contractors play in supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq necessitates that the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believe that poor contract management has played a role in permitting abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of December 2010, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (159,000) than uniformed personnel (144,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq. According to DOD, in Afghanistan, as of December 2010, there were 87,483 DOD contractor personnel, compared to approximately 96,900 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 47% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan at that time. This compares to December 2008, when contractors represented 69% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan. According to DOD data, the recent surge of uniformed personnel in Afghanistan and the increase in contract obligations did not result in a corresponding increase in contractor personnel."
Posted in Current Affairs
Posted on April 28, 2009.
The Special inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has posted 3 recent audit reports.
09-914 - Security Forces: Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems, April 26, 2009 From the report:
This report discusses one of the largest Department of Defense contracts funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The contract was awarded to AECOM Government Services (AECOM) for Global Maintenance and Supply Services in Iraq (GMASS). This contract supports a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) program to assist the Iraqi Army develop a logistics capability so that it can be self-sufficient. SIGIR reviewed three task orders under the contract; Task Order 3, for the renovation of maintenance facilities, the repair and maintenance of Iraqi Army vehicles and equipment, the purchase of a parts inventory, and on-the-job training; Task Order 5, which incorporated the requirements of Task Order 3, extends its period of performance, and transitions the maintenance and supply operations to Iraqi control; and Task Order 6, for refurbishing up to 8,500 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and training the Iraqi Army in their maintenance.
09-016 – Asset-transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability 26, 2009 From the report:
After more than four years of reconstruction activity, U.S. reconstruction agencies continue to experience difficulties transferring completed projects to the Government of Iraq (GOI). GOI recognition of projects is important to ensure ongoing support for the projects, to inform its own reconstruction planning, and to leverage completed projects to obtain financing for future initiatives from world markets. This review follows up on SIGIR’s earlier work to determine (1) the extent to which U.S. reconstruction agencies working in Iraq have made progress in establishing a uniform policy and procedure for transferring projects to the GOI, and (2) whether the Embassy has made progress in obtaining GOI support for a formal asset-transfer agreement.
09-017 – Need to Enhance Oversight of Theater-Wide Internal Security Services Contracts, April 24, 2009 From the report:
Private security contractors (PSCs) play an important role in Iraq by protecting U.S. personnel, facilities, and property related to reconstruction efforts. In September 2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) competitively awarded five Theater-Wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) contracts to five PSCs for static, or fixed site security services in Iraq. The contracts have a combined not-to-exceed maximum value of $450 million. The companies are among the seven largest private security service providers in Iraq.
Posted in News
Posted on July 1, 2008.
Rand has finally been able to release its report “After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq.” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG642.pdf.
This report examined activities through June 2004 and part of an “eight-volume collection of reports that the RAND Arroyo Center undertook to prepare an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq. Six of the volumes are classified. The other unclassified volume is being finalized.”
Abstract: “This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.”
Posted in Links of Interest